More Troops In Iraq?
I’ve been thinking about the Iraq war with congress now arguing over settting a timetable for withdrawal of the troops. But I think the thing that would make the most sense would actually be to send more troops to Iraq. One of the problems since the start of the war has been the fact that Rumsfeld sent far fewer troops than his generals thought was necessary. We have barely enough troops to keep even with the insurgency and we’re forced to try to whittle down their forces slowly in a long drawn-out war. Meanwhile they are able to fight back and kill many of our troops. We’re just spread too thin. We should send more troops so we can end the insurgency much quicker and with fewer deaths. Then we can bring ALL the troops back home much sooner.
June 20th, 2006 at 6:26 pm
Hm. I can see the point in this argument, but I think I would only be comfortable sending more troops if we still planned a specific pullout date. I’m not comfortable with the appearance that we don’t plan to leave. Since it looks to many Iraqis like we are imperialists there for their oil, staying longer only makes it look worse. I agree that the country is in a horrible position right now, but I also think we need to send a strong message that we are NOT staying indefinitely. At the moment I feel that I’m just not convinced that we have any control over the situation, even with sending more troops, and I’m really wary of just getting deeper into a quagmire, like in Vietnam. I mean, taht’s what happened with Vietnam, we kept sending more troops thinking that this bunch would get us over the hump and the war would finally end, but it didn’t work.
June 21st, 2006 at 10:00 am
Well my main worry is I don’t want to see us pull out our troops and Iraq ends up in a terrible civil war. Iran and other countries would join in along with Al Queda and it would get pretty ugly.
So I dont’ know if I would agree with setting some arbitrary date like Jan 1st for troop withdrawal, but some other goal that would mean that Iraq will likely be stable. But even saying that we have some plan for leaving would be a good idea.
June 21st, 2006 at 1:43 pm
1. Alo.
2. This is the strategy of escalation. The last time the US was involved in a war like this (Vietnam), it did exactly this. It escalated the conflict. The escalation of the war wound up costing the lives of many more American troops and millions upon millions more dollars, yet it failed to meet its objectives. If the US had realized that it was in over its head and pulled out in 1964, more than half of the lives that were destroyed in that war would have been saved.
3. Our military is weak and over-extended as it is. We couldn’t bring Iraq under total control even if we wanted to… nevermind our other commitments, such as Afghanistan, which btw is currently in the midst of more fighting than at any point since the invasion.
4. Civil war is going to happen regardless of whether we’re there or not. There is going to be fighting and brutality until there is a stable power structure in place.
The war was a mistake. We’re in over our head. We should cut our losses and get out ASAP.
June 21st, 2006 at 2:28 pm
I guess I just don’t feel comfortable letting tens of thousands of Iraqi’s die in a civil war that we created (in addition to the havoc it would create in the Mid East) if might be possible to prevent the civil war. I’m not saying we need “total control” over Iraq, but we need to leave it stable enough that it doesn’t fall into complete anarchy and civil war.
June 22nd, 2006 at 12:15 pm
Yes, we should make an effort to keep it intact. None of the proposals for withdrawal call for absolute, total and immediate withdrawal — just for an accelerated timeline, and for limited involvement thereafter.
Unfortunately, Iraqis are going to have to endure a lot of suffering before the whole situation is improved, no matter what happens.
June 22nd, 2006 at 1:01 pm
I guess that depends on your definition of “immediate”. Kerry’s original proposal was to redeploy all troops by Dec 31st, the one that was voted on was to do it by July 2007.
Obviously our government is pretty bad (terrible) at understanding the situation in Iraq and predicting what will happen. So to try to say that we know Iraq will be stable enough to pull out the troops in 6 months or 12 months seems absurd. We have no idea. The proposal should be that we will withdraw the troops when Iraq’s govt and army shows some sign of being strong enough to prevent a civil war.
June 22nd, 2006 at 1:08 pm
The point isn’t that we’ll know exactly what the situation is going to be in 6 months or a year. The point is that we have to set a goal and get out of there already.
How long do you think we should wait before we realize that our being there is not helping matters? 1 year? 2 years? 10 years? 20 years?
There’s chaos there right now. There’s chaos in Afghanistan right now. Our incompetent government is only getting us in deeper and deeper trouble with the rest of the world.
June 22nd, 2006 at 1:20 pm
Well I disagree with you that us being there is not helping matters. Why wouldn’t you advocate pulling out now if nothing is going to improve in the next year?
I think things actually are improving and if we leave too quickly then Iraq will collapse into civil war. Iraq is actually setting up an elected government and troops are being trained (however slowly). If a civil war occurs, the surrounding countries with ties to the various ethnic groups will join in, officially or not, and it will become a real mess. If we wait another few months until it looks like we could leave without such a thing happening, it will be worth while.
I think will be in deeper trouble if we let such a war happen in Iraq. It will much worse for Iraqis, their neighbors, us, and the world.
I agree we should set a goal and get out of there but an arbitrary date makes no sense. If Iraq would be stable enough in 14 months but we leave in 12, then those 12 months are wasted and we should pull out now. And if Iraq is stable in 4 months and we wait 12 then thats a waste too.
I think there are three reasonable viewpoints here:
1. Iraq is stable and we should pull out the troops now.
2. Iraq is going to fall into civil war no matter what so we should pull out the troops now.
3. Iraq will be stable enough soon and we should keep the troops there until they are.
An arbitrary 1-year deadline for troop withdrawal doesn’t make sense in any of these three situations.
June 22nd, 2006 at 1:38 pm
So how long would you wait for Iraq to be ready before leaving?
June 22nd, 2006 at 2:50 pm
I don’t know, a year or two probably. So I know you’re going to say that we should pass give a 12 month deadline or whatever as the limit for how long we will give Iraq to get stable. I guess that makes some sense, but I still think the consequences for leaving too early could be extremely severe.
Anyway my original point was, if you think Iraq is improving or has a chance to improve then we want it to improve as fast as possible to the point that we can leave it stable and get the troops out of there. I don’t know if there really is a correlation between the number of troops and the speed at which the Iraqi people gain control over the situation, but we should try to speed that up as much as possible, if it means sending more troops then we should, if it means taking them away then we should. We want Iraq to be stable and our troops to be out ASAP. I would prefer that to Iraq being in civil war and our troops to be out.
June 22nd, 2006 at 3:11 pm
Basically my thinking is, we want to get the troops out of there within a year AND make sure Iraq doesnt fall into civil war. So we better ramp up our efforts on getting Iraq stable. Sending more people to train Iraqi troops, providing them equipment or other assistance, we need to get them stable so we can get the hell out soon. We need to have a plan rather than just a withdrawal date.
June 22nd, 2006 at 4:23 pm
I also want the US to get out fast while also preventing Iraq from plunging into an even worse state of affairs (in so far as we can).
We should have 2 criteria for withdrawal: (1) the state of Iraqi affairs and (2) time.
The Republicans stress the former. They have deliberately said nothing about the latter. Years have passed already. If, in 5 years, Iraq is still a mess, they will no doubt be saying that we should stay a little longer, just until things are better. That’s the same thing that happened in Vietnam.
We need to stress that this will not be the open-ended engagement that Vietnam was. We need to establish a sense of urgency. Setting a date for withdrawal is a way of making sure that we get things done as fast as possible. It’s self-imposed, so obviously it can be changed if it really has to be for some reason. (If Iran starts a war with Israel I’m sure we’ll have no problem with scrapping the deadline, for example.)
What I dread is the *endlessness* of the present situation in Iraq. (How many “turning points” have we had already?)
And btw, it seems that every day another American does something to piss off the Arab world. Torturing prisoners, killing civilians, raping women, etc. The allegations are many, and by staying there, we’re exposing ourselves to more and more of this.
The hatred of the muslim world against us for unjustly invading and occupying a country should be viewed as a ticking time bomb.
June 22nd, 2006 at 4:39 pm
I agree we need to get out fast and we don’t want and endless war which is why we need a PLAN to get out of there fast instead of just a date.
And if you’re worried about the hatred of the Muslim world now, I think its miniscule compared to the reaction if we leave Iraq in a civil war.
June 22nd, 2006 at 4:52 pm
Who says that we should set a date without a plan?
June 22nd, 2006 at 5:11 pm
No one’s had a plan the entire time, thats why its such a mess.
Look we both agree that we want the troops out of there as soon we can. We just disagree on the severity of the consequences of leaving too early. I think it’s more important that we ensure that Iraq does not end up in civil war and de-stabililze the entire region.
So you can say again and again how we need to get the troops out of there soon, and I agree with you, but you tell me nothing about how you think this will affect Iraq and the mideast. Do you think Iraq will be stable? Do you think a civil war wouldn’t be that bad? Do you think its impossible to leave Iraq stable? You’re not responding to any of the points I’ve been making.
June 23rd, 2006 at 11:56 am
“No one’s had a plan the entire time, thats why its such a mess.”
But the Democrats do call for a plan, in addition to a deadline. It’s not fair to say that “we need a PLAN to get out of there fast instead of just a date.” Everyone agrees on the necessity of a plan. The issue at hand is whether a deadline is a good idea or not.
“Look we both agree that we want the troops out of there as soon we can. We just disagree on the severity of the consequences of leaving too early.”
True.
“I think it’s more important that we ensure that Iraq does not end up in civil war and de-stabililze the entire region. So you can say again and again how we need to get the troops out of there soon, and I agree with you, but you tell me nothing about how you think this will affect Iraq and the mideast. Do you think Iraq will be stable? Do you think a civil war wouldn’t be that bad? Do you think its impossible to leave Iraq stable? You’re not responding to any of the points I’ve been making.”
Before getting into what I think would happen if we left, I’ll say what I think is happening right now.
Right now, Iraq is not stable.
Right now, Iraq is in a state of civil war.
The heirarchy of power (and hence order) that existed during the reign of Hussein has been shattered. There is a lot of disagreement about who should take over, so the debate must be settled through brute force.
That is happening now, and that will continue to happen, regardless of whether we are there or not.
If we left, this is what I think would happen: there would continue to be conflict. Eventually, out of the violence, the most powerful group would emerge the victor. Maybe the Kurds would break off and form their own government, which they want anyway. The United States would support whoever the likely victors turn out to be, giving them arms, money and intelligence, and getting oil and strategic military access in return, and life would go back to normal.
Most likely, the resulting government would involve Islamic law, but would at least pay lip service to the notion of a representative government (in much the same way that Saddam’s government did). The US, wanting to spin the situation into a success story, would call them “democratic” etc., even if it wasn’t really any more democratic than Saddam. We’d have another Saddam, but be on better diplomatic terms with them (i.e., we’d have Saddam the way he was in the early 80’s).
The Iraqi people would not be truly “free” but they would be living in an orderly state, eventually with mortality rates dropping to their prewar levels and productivity rising to its prewar level.
And yes, it would, frankly, suck to be an Iraqi — but it would suck less than it does now.
As for civil war / regional instability:
I think fears about civil war neglect the fact that the country is in a state of civil war right now, underestimate the degree to which our presence is aggravating the conflict, and overestimate the degree to which we could control the situation.
I think fear of regional instability is overblown; I see no reason to think that (locally) things can get much worse than they are now, and I see no reason to think that (globally) it would have any more of a detrimental effect than the war has already had.
We would be better off — less body bags coming back, less billions going out, less hatred bubbling against us. The Iraqis would be better off than they are now. The Kurds would be better off.
Iraq would not be the land of the free and the home of the brave in the Middle-East, but that was a Quixotic mirage from the beginning, and any chance of that happening died shortly after the fall of Baghdad. We should realize this and let things play out without exacerbating the problem.
Here’s a decent argument to this effect:
If America Left Iraq
The case for cutting and running
by Nir Rosen
…..
At some point—whether sooner or later—U.S. troops will leave Iraq. I have spent much of the occupation reporting from Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Fallujah, and elsewhere in the country, and I can tell you that a growing majority of Iraqis would like it to be sooner. As the occupation wears on, more and more Iraqis chafe at its failure to provide stability or even electricity, and they have grown to hate the explosions, gunfire, and constant war, and also the daily annoyances: having to wait hours in traffic because the Americans have closed off half the city; having to sit in that traffic behind a U.S. military vehicle pointing its weapons at them; having to endure constant searches and arrests. Before the January 30 elections this year the Association of Muslim Scholars—Iraq’s most important Sunni Arab body, and one closely tied to the indigenous majority of the insurgency—called for a commitment to a timely U.S. withdrawal as a condition for its participation in the vote. (In exchange the association promised to rein in the resistance.) It’s not just Sunnis who have demanded a withdrawal: the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who is immensely popular among the young and the poor, has made a similar demand. So has the mainstream leader of the Shiites’ Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, who made his first call for U.S. withdrawal as early as April 23, 2003.
If the people the U.S. military is ostensibly protecting want it to go, why do the soldiers stay? The most common answer is that it would be irresponsible for the United States to depart before some measure of peace has been assured. The American presence, this argument goes, is the only thing keeping Iraq from an all-out civil war that could take millions of lives and would profoundly destabilize the region. But is that really the case? Let’s consider the key questions surrounding the prospect of an imminent American withdrawal.
Would the withdrawal of U.S. troops ignite a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites?
No. That civil war is already under way—in large part because of the American presence. The longer the United States stays, the more it fuels Sunni hostility toward Shiite “collaborators.” Were America not in Iraq, Sunni leaders could negotiate and participate without fear that they themselves would be branded traitors and collaborators by their constituents. Sunni leaders have said this in official public statements; leaders of the resistance have told me the same thing in private. The Iraqi government, which is currently dominated by Shiites, would lose its quisling stigma. Iraq’s security forces, also primarily Shiite, would no longer be working on behalf of foreign infidels against fellow Iraqis, but would be able to function independently and recruit Sunnis to a truly national force. The mere announcement of an intended U.S. withdrawal would allow Sunnis to come to the table and participate in defining the new Iraq.
But if American troops aren’t in Baghdad, what’s to stop the Sunnis from launching an assault and seizing control of the city?
Sunni forces could not mount such an assault. The preponderance of power now lies with the majority Shiites and the Kurds, and the Sunnis know this. Sunni fighters wield only small arms and explosives, not Saddam’s tanks and helicopters, and are very weak compared with the cohesive, better armed, and numerically superior Shiite and Kurdish militias. Most important, Iraqi nationalism—not intramural rivalry—is the chief motivator for both Shiites and Sunnis. Most insurgency groups view themselves as waging a muqawama—a resistance—rather than a jihad. This is evident in their names and in their propaganda. For instance, the units commanded by the Association of Muslim Scholars are named after the 1920 revolt against the British. Others have names such as Iraqi Islamic Army and Flame of Iraq. They display the Iraqi flag rather than a flag of jihad. Insurgent attacks are meant primarily to punish those who have collaborated with the Americans and to deter future collaboration.
Wouldn’t a U.S. withdrawal embolden the insurgency?
No. If the occupation were to end, so, too, would the insurgency. After all, what the resistance movement has been resisting is the occupation. Who would the insurgents fight if the enemy left? When I asked Sunni Arab fighters and the clerics who support them why they were fighting, they all gave me the same one-word answer: intiqaam—revenge. Revenge for the destruction of their homes, for the shame they felt when Americans forced them to the ground and stepped on them, for the killing of their friends and relatives by U.S. soldiers either in combat or during raids.
But what about the foreign jihadi element of the resistance? Wouldn’t it be empowered by a U.S. withdrawal?
The foreign jihadi element—commanded by the likes of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—is numerically insignificant; the bulk of the resistance has no connection to al-Qaeda or its offshoots. (Zarqawi and his followers have benefited greatly from U.S. propaganda blaming him for all attacks in Iraq, because he is now seen by Arabs around the world as more powerful than he is; we have been his best recruiting tool.) It is true that the Sunni resistance welcomed the foreign fighters (and to some extent still do), because they were far more willing to die than indigenous Iraqis were. But what Zarqawi wants fundamentally conflicts with what Iraqi Sunnis want: Zarqawi seeks re-establishment of the Muslim caliphate and a Manichean confrontation with infidels around the world, to last until Judgment Day; the mainstream Iraqi resistance just wants the Americans out. If U.S. forces were to leave, the foreigners in Zarqawi’s movement would find little support—and perhaps significant animosity—among Iraqi Sunnis, who want wealth and power, not jihad until death. They have already lost much of their support: many Iraqis have begun turning on them. In the heavily Shia Sadr City foreign jihadis had burning tires placed around their necks. The foreigners have not managed to establish themselves decisively in any large cities. Even at the height of their power in Fallujah they could control only one neighborhood, the Julan, and they were hated by the city’s resistance council. Today foreign fighters hide in small villages and are used opportunistically by the nationalist resistance.
When the Americans depart and Sunnis join the Iraqi government, some of the foreign jihadis in Iraq may try to continue the struggle—but they will have committed enemies in both Baghdad and the Shiite south, and the entire Sunni triangle will be against them. They will have nowhere to hide. Nor can they merely take their battle to the West. The jihadis need a failed state like Iraq in which to operate. When they leave Iraq, they will be hounded by Arab and Western security agencies.
What about the Kurds? Won’t they secede if the United States leaves?
Yes, but that’s going to happen anyway. All Iraqi Kurds want an independent Kurdistan. They do not feel Iraqi. They’ve effectively had more than a decade of autonomy, thanks to the UN-imposed no-fly zone; they want nothing to do with the chaos that is Iraq. Kurdish independence is inevitable—and positive. (Few peoples on earth deserve a state more than the Kurds.) For the moment the Kurdish government in the north is officially participating in the federalist plan—but the Kurds are preparing for secession. They have their own troops, the peshmerga, thought to contain 50,000 to 100,000 fighters. They essentially control the oil city of Kirkuk. They also happen to be the most America-loving people I have ever met; their leaders openly seek to become, like Israel, a proxy for American interests. If what the United States wants is long-term bases in the region, the Kurds are its partners.
Would Turkey invade in response to a Kurdish secession?
For the moment Turkey is more concerned with EU membership than with Iraq’s Kurds—who in any event have expressed no ambitions to expand into Turkey. Iraq’s Kurds speak a dialect different from Turkey’s, and, in fact, have a history of animosity toward Turkish Kurds. Besides, Turkey, as a member of NATO, would be reluctant to attack in defiance of the United States. Turkey would be satisfied with guarantees that it would have continued access to Kurdish oil and trade and that Iraqi Kurds would not incite rebellion in Turkey.
Would Iran effectively take over Iraq?
No. Iraqis are fiercely nationalist—even the country’s Shiites resent Iranian meddling. (It is true that some Iraqi Shiites view Iran as an ally, because many of their leaders found safe haven there when exiled by Saddam—but thousands of other Iraqi Shiites experienced years of misery as prisoners of war in Iran.) Even in southeastern towns near the border I encountered only hostility toward Iran.
What about the goal of creating a secular democracy in Iraq that respects the rights of women and non-Muslims?
Give it up. It’s not going to happen. Apart from the Kurds, who revel in their secularism, Iraqis overwhelmingly seek a Muslim state. Although Iraq may have been officially secular during the 1970s and 1980s, Saddam encouraged Islamism during the 1990s, and the difficulties of the past decades have strengthened the resurgence of Islam. In the absence of any other social institutions, the mosques and the clergy assumed the dominant role in Iraq following the invasion. Even Baathist resistance leaders told me they have returned to Islam to atone for their sins under Saddam. Most Shiites, too, follow one cleric or another. Ayatollah al-Sistani—supposedly a moderate—wants Islam to be the source of law. The invasion of Iraq has led to a theocracy, which can only grow more hostile to America as long as U.S. soldiers are present. Does Iraqi history offer any lessons?
The British occupation of Iraq, in the first half of the twentieth century, may be instructive. The British faced several uprisings and coups. The Iraqi government, then as now, was unable to suppress the rebels on its own and relied on the occupying military. In 1958, when the government the British helped install finally fell, those who had collaborated with them could find no popular support; some, including the former prime minister Nuri Said, were murdered and mutilated. Said had once been a respected figure, but he became tainted by his collaboration with the British. That year, when revolutionary officers overthrew the government, Said disguised himself as a woman and tried to escape. He was discovered, shot in the head, and buried. The next day a mob dug up his corpse and dragged it through the street—an act that would be repeated so often in Iraq that it earned its own word: sahil. With the British-sponsored government gone, both Sunni and Shiite Arabs embraced the Iraqi identity. The Kurds still resent the British perfidy that made them part of Iraq.
What can the United States do to repair Iraq?
There is no panacea. Iraq is a destroyed and fissiparous country. Iranians and Saudis I’ve spoken to worry that it might be impossible to keep Iraq from disintegrating. But they agree that the best hope of avoiding this scenario is if the United States leaves; perhaps then Iraqi nationalism will keep at least the Arabs united. The sooner America withdraws and allows Iraqis to assume control of their own country, the better the chances that Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari won’t face sahil. It may be decades before Iraq recovers from the current maelstrom. By then its borders may be different, its vaunted secularism a distant relic. But a continued U.S. occupation can only get in the way.
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200512/iraq-withdrawal
June 25th, 2006 at 10:37 pm
Now that was an argument that makes a lot of sense.
It’s really hard to tell though what is really going on over there and what the Iraqi’s really think and feel. From the Iraqi blogs I’ve read, it seems like they really want to have a democracy and are just as upset about the Sunni-Shiite attacks as the US-Iraqi ones. But of course the few Iraqi’s who actually have the access and opportunity to blog can’t be too representative of the nation as a whole. But it does make me want to put in more effort to help them. But as you and Nir Rosen said, that may be better done by leaving.
The problem with figuring out what would happen when we withdraw is with finding out how the Iraqi’s actually feel about what is going on. It’s tough to get any reports directly from Iraqi’s and any 3rd person reports from Rosen or Fox News or anywhere else are always biased one way or the other depending on what they want to tell.
So like I said before, I would like to see us do whatever is best for the Iraqi’s and the Americans, whether its to pull the troops out, put more troops in, etc. etc. But I think I’d have to do a lot more research before I could make a good decision on what the best course of action is.
June 26th, 2006 at 12:32 pm
Cool. Let me know if you see anything persuasive one way or the other about any of this stuff.
Here’s another argument for “cutting and running,” but from a retired General (and former head of the NSA). It was published a year ago, but it’s still rather relevant:
http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask_this.view&askthisid=129
June 26th, 2006 at 1:20 pm
Another good argument for withdrawal…
July 18th, 2006 at 9:42 pm
A new article in the New York Times says Sunnis now want the US troops to stay in Iraq or even add troops:
The Sunni Arab leaders say they have no newfound love for the Americans. Many say they still sympathize with the insurgency and despise the Bush administration and the fact that the invasion has helped strengthen the power of neighboring Iran, which backs the ruling Shiite parties.
But the Sunni leaders have dropped demands for a quick withdrawal of American troops. Many now ask for little more than a timetable. A few Sunni leaders even say they want more American soldiers on the ground to help contain the widening chaos.
…
A year ago, the party of Tariq al-Hashemi, a hard-line Sunni Arab who is one of Iraq’s two vice presidents, was calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops.
“The situation is different now,” Mr. Hashemi said. “I don’t want the Americans to say bye-bye. Tomorrow, if they were to leave the country, there would be a security vacuum, and that would lead inevitably to civil war.”
July 18th, 2006 at 10:09 pm
Interesting turn of events. How ironic that the group in Iraq that has suffered the most because of the invasion is now, well, at least divided over whether they want the Americans to stay.
A few things though:
1. It sounds like it’s only a minority of a minority (i.e., just a few of the Sunnis, which themselves make up a small portion of Iraqis) that actually wants the US to increase their presence. From the sound of the article, the majority of Sunnis still want the US out — and under a timetable! — although no longer “immediately.”
2. Of all the groups in Iraq, the Sunnis are the ones that have lost the most power — and therefore the ones that have the least to lose by the increased participation of the US. What of the Shiite majority? What of the Kurds?
I’d love to see Iraqis — all Iraqis — answer the following question:
When do you want the US to withdraw from Iraq?
1) now.
2) within 1 year
3) within 5 years
4) within 10 years
5) never
My guess is that over 90% of Iraqis would vote a or b.
July 18th, 2006 at 10:16 pm
I read your whole conversation, and it sounds like the issues are pretty much ones I had shared in trying to determine what I supported for the country. Like both Todd and Rick, I want what’s best for Iraq. I don’t wish the civil war to last any longer than it has to, but I do believe that the country is already in civil war and that it will inevitably last a little longer. The big question, though, is will it be shorter if we leave or if we stay. I tend to leave towards it being shorter if we leave, but perhaps that’s just because I’m pessimistic and I view America as being awfully imperialist and unhelpful.
July 18th, 2006 at 10:20 pm
make that “inevitably last AT LEAST a little bit longer”